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Services trade reform matters, but what is Doha doing about it? It has been hard to judge, because of the opaqueness of services policies and the opaqueness of the request-offer negotiating process. This paper attempts to assess what is on the table. It presents the results of the first survey of applied trade policies in the major services sectors of 56 industrial and developing countries. These policies are then compared with these countries' Uruguay Round commitments in services and the best offers that they have made in the current Doha negotiations. The paper finds that at this stage, Doha promises greater This paper-a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the department to understand services trade, policy reform and international cooperation. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at bgootiiz@worldbank.org and amattoo@ worldbank.org. security of access to markets but not any additional liberalization. Uruguay Round commitments are on average 2.3 times more restrictive than current policies. The best offers submitted so far as part of the Doha negotiations improve on Uruguay Round commitments by about 13 percent but remain on average 1.9 times more restrictive than actual policies. The World Trade Organization's Hong Kong Ministerial had set out ambitious goals for services but the analysis here shows that much remains to be done to achieve them.
In the Doha negotiations, the focus is primarily on agriculture and manufactured goods. Services are mentioned, but more out of a sense of obligation than conviction. This is a puzzle. Some 80 percent of GDP in the US and the EU originates in services. Together they account for over 60 percent of world services exports. The business service exports of India, China and Brazil have grown by well over 10 percent every year for the last decade, and India may soon export more services than goods.
The potential gains from reform of trade in communications, finance, transport and business services are large -probably larger than those from comparable liberalization of goods trade. Even exploiting the opportunities arising from goods trade liberalization will require better services: Sub-Saharan African exporters today pay transport costs many times greater than the tariffs they face in industrial country markets.
1 Moreover, without progress in services there simply may not be enough on the table to allow progress in other market access areas: services are the strongest export interest of WTO members like the EU, India and US that are the focal point of efforts to liberalize agricultural trade.
So services matter. But what is Doha doing about it? It has been hard to judge, because of the opaqueness of services policies and the opaqueness of the request-offer negotiating process. This paper tries to assess what is on the table. It begins by summarizing what we believe is the first survey of applied trade policies in the major services sectors of 56 industrial and developing countries. These policies are then compared with these countries' Uruguay Round commitments in services and the best offers that they have made in the current Doha negotiations.
The bottom line: At this stage, Doha promises somewhat greater security of access to services markets but not an iota of liberalization. Ironically, two of the most protected sectors, transport and professional services (involving the international mobility of people), are either not being negotiated at all or not with any degree if seriousness. Uruguay Round commitments are on average 2.3 times more restrictive than current policies. The best offers submitted so far as part of the Doha negotiations improve on UR commitments by about 13% but are still on average 1.9 times more restrictive than actual policies. At present, Doha offers not greater access to markets but a weak assurance that access will not get worse.
Negotiators have been content to let services lag. The "request-offer" negotiating process has resulted in a low-level equilibrium trap. As important, services have not been given the political attention their economic significance deserves. The WTO's Hong Kong Ministerial had set out ambitious goals. Our analysis shows that those goals are still remote. Section I of this note describes our survey and the policies on the ground in the countries surveyed. Section II describes how Doha improves on the Uruguay Round, and how far offers are from reality. Section III concludes with unsolicited advice on how we might do better.
Source of data and methodology
An ongoing research project by the World Bank is compiling data on actual or applied trade policies in services. To date surveys have been conducted in 32 developing and transition countries and comparable information obtained for 24 OECD countries.
The following sectors were included in the survey: financial services (includes retail banking, life and automobile insurance, and reinsurance), telecommunications (includes fixed and mobile), retail distribution, transportation (air passenger, road and railway freight, maritime international shipping and maritime auxiliary services), and selected professional services.
2 In each sector, the survey covers the most relevant modes of supplying that service: cross border trade in services (mode 1 in WTO parlance) in financial, transportation and professional services; commercial presence or FDI (mode 3) in each services sector; and the presence of service supplying individuals (mode 4) in professional services.
In each of the 32 developing and transition countries, the surveys were completed by local law firms which were familiar with the policy regime in the sectors. For the 24 OECD countries, the comparable policy information was collected from various publicly available sources, including their GATS commitments and the most recent offers, and other sector specific databases such as Economic Intelligence Unit Country Finance reports, IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate and Exchange Arrangements, and the AXCO insurance database. The survey information and the OECD policy summaries are confirmed by the government trade officials during 2008. Government officials from sixty per cent of the countries covered responded and confirmed the accuracy of the policy information. Some revisions were made to the policy summary after the follow up with the governments. 3 The UR commitments and the Doha Offers came from the WTO.
To capture the broad restrictiveness of services trade policies and commitments, a summary of key restrictions was prepared for each sector-mode. Then, each summary was mapped on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (for no restrictions) to 1 (highly restricted) 4 , with three intermediate levels of restrictiveness (0.25. 0.50 and 0.75) (Annex Table 2 ).
5 Furthermore, sector results are aggregated across modes of supply using weights that reflect judgments of the relative importance of the different modes for a sector (Annex Table 3 ). For example, mode 4 (temporary movement of suppliers) is important for professional services, but not for telecommunications, where mode 3 is the dominant mode of contesting a market. Sector restrictiveness indices are aggregated using sector GDP shares as weights 6 . Finally, the regional services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) are the simple averages of the country indices within respective regions.
I. THE STATE OF ACTUAL POLICY IN SERVICES
An evaluation of what Doha offers in services is much harder than in goods. First, there is no database of actual trade policies in specific services sectors -i.e. the counterpart of "applied" tariffs. Second, the Doha negotiations in services are not based on an agreed formula for cuts in protection but on offers by each member of market access (and national treatment) in specific sectors. Third, it is hard to quantify services trade policies, which are akin to non-tariff barriers and include prohibitions, quotas, and discriminatory regulation. We describe here efforts to overcome these difficulties and construct a picture of what Doha offers in services. The survey reveals that developing countries have significantly liberalized a range of service sectors over the last couple of decades, but in some areas protection persists ( Figure 3 ). In fact, the overall pattern of policies across sectors is increasingly similar in developing and industrial countries. In telecommunications, public monopolies seem in most countries a relic of history, with at least some measure of competition introduced in both mobile and fixed services. In banking too, domination by state-owned banks has given way to increased openness to the presence of foreign and private banks. Very few countries restrict foreign investment in retail. However, even though the markets for these services are now more competitive, they are in most countries some distance from being truly contestable. In telecommunications, governments continue to limit the number of providers and, particularly in Asia, the extent of foreign ownership. In both banking and insurance, the allocation of new licenses remains opaque and highly discretionary. In retail, a range of domestic regulations, such as zoning laws and single brand retailing, severely impede entry in both developing and industrial countries. 6 The same sector shares are used for all countries for comparability.
Transport and professional services remain a bastion of protectionism in high-income countries and are also subject to high barriers in developing countries. In maritime transport, even though international shipping is today quite open, entry into cabotage and auxiliary services such as cargo handling is in many countries restricted. In professional services, even though there is increased scope for international trade through electronic means, there remain restrictions on foreign presence, particularly of individual service providers. In general, accounting and the practice of international law tend to be more open than auditing and the practice of domestic law.
In the sectors and modes covered here, the restrictions on foreign investment are generally less stringent than the restrictions on cross-border trade, and far less stringent than the presence of foreign professionals (Figure 4 ). Note: Financial services include banking and life and non-life insurance and reinsurance, telecommunications include fixed and mobile telecom, transportation includes air passenger, maritime shipping, and auxiliary services, and professional services include accounting, auditing, and legal services. 
II. WHAT DOES DOHA OFFER?
Most services liberalization all around the world has so far been undertaken unilaterally. Multilateral negotiations on services began in the Uruguay Round. These negotiations reduced policy uncertainty by inducing countries to begin to lock-in unilateral liberalization, but the negotiations produced little additional market-opening (Hoekman, 2006) . The same is true for most regional agreements on services, with a few exceptions.
What is currently on the table in Doha? Consider first what is not. Doha offers as they stand today do not offer any liberalization of actual policy in the sectors and modes of supply examined here. Ironically, two of the currently most protected sectors, transport and professional services, are either not being negotiated at all or not with any degree of seriousness. The Annex to the GATS on Air Transport Services excludes from the scope of the GATS all measures affecting air traffic rights and services directly related to the exercise of air traffic rights. The maritime negotiations are notionally on (with offers from some countries) but have never really got off the ground because the United States is unwilling to accept GATS disciplines (particularly the MFN principle) on maritime transport and has not made any commitments or offers in this area. As far as professional services are concerned, a vital mode of supply, the presence of natural persons, faces almost insurmountable barriers in most countries because trade negotiators have had little liberalizing influence on immigration policy and domestic regulations such as licensing and qualification requirements.
Given that liberalization is not on the table, the question is whether the current Doha offers involve any greater security of access than the Uruguay Round (UR) commitments under the GATS. What has so far been accomplished in this respect can be assessed by comparing actual policy with UR Commitments and the offers submitted so far as part of the Doha negotiations.
Of the 56 countries surveyed, Russia was excluded from the comparative analysis because it is not yet a WTO member. Of the remaining countries, 45 submitted Doha Round Offers, 7 (Ecuador, Ghana, Mongolia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Venezuela) have not submitted offers and 3 (Cambodia, Saudi Arabia, and Ukraine) have recently submitted Accession Schedules. For these latter ten countries, as well as for other countries which did not improve their UR commitments, the scores assigned for the offers are the same as those for the UR commitments. For each country, there are 26 sector-modes 8 (that is a specific mode of supply in a specific sector) for which the actual policies are compared with the UR commitments and Doha Offers. Of the maximum possible number of sector-modes (26x55), countries did not make any commitments or entered "unbound" in 36 per cent of sector-modes. In 85 per cent of the sectormodes, Doha Offers do not improve the UR commitments.
As Figures 5, 6 and 7 show, in all regions of the world, actual policy is substantially more liberal than the UR commitments. Uruguay Round commitments are on average 2.3 times more restrictive than current policies (Table 1; Annex Tables 1 and 3) , in other words, the binding gap (UR commitment minus actual policies) remains on average 130 per cent more restrictive than the policies. As Figure 5 shows, the poorer countries have on average bigger binding gaps between commitments and actual policy.
Doha offers improve on the UR commitments, but the Offer gap between offers and actual policy
is large. Doha offers are on average 1.9 times more restrictive than the actual policies (Table 1;  Annex Tables 2 and 3) , meaning the Offer gap (Doha Offers minus actual policies) remains on average 99 per cent more restrictive than the policies. Interestingly, as Figure 6 shows, the absolute improvement in offers is on average the same at all levels of income. At present, Doha does not offer much liberalization, rather some reassurance that access will not get worse. At the regional level:
-African countries have actual policies that are significantly more liberal than their UR commitments, and comparable to those of OECD countries. Four of the six African countries considered here (Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, and Tanzania) did not submit Doha offers. The offers of the other two countries, Kenya and South Africa, did not make a significant improvement over their UR commitments in the sectors covered in this survey. During the Uruguay round, most low-income countries did not schedule commitments in their major sectors. For example, Tanzania scheduled only the tourism sector.
-Eastern European countries have actual policies, UR commitments, and Doha offers that are much more liberal than those of the other regions. The gap between their commitments and policies, and the gap between their offers and policies is not large. This is because the initial commitments of the ECA countries were quite liberal and ambitious (see for example the accession schedule of Ukraine). In the Doha Round, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Lithuania did not make independent offers, but were covered by the offer of the European Community (EC).
-The OECD countries and those in the LAC region have actual policies which are more liberal than their Uruguay Round commitments. Their Doha offers improve somewhat on their UR commitments and narrow the gap with actual policies. The offer gap in the LAC region remains very large, while the offer gap is small for the OECD.
-Countries belonging to South Asia (SAR) have the most restrictive policies and the UR commitments. However, the offers made by the region significantly improve on the commitments. Compared to the other non-OECD partners, countries in SAR have made greater improvements in Doha.
-Countries in EAP and MENA offered little in the Doha Round. Their applied policies are restrictive and their offer gap is smaller. -In maritime transport, there is a huge gap between UR commitments (or the lack of them) and actual policy, which Doha offers have narrowed but only by about half. Most improvements were made in the maritime auxiliary services and cross-border maritime shipping, offered for example by the EC Member States. Most OECD countries kept the status of "unbound" in maritime transport through mode 3. From the OECD, only the US did not make any improvement in maritime transport.
-In professional services, actual policies are highly restrictive (especially for the presence of natural persons), and Doha offers have narrowed the gap between UR commitments and actual policy. Since both actual policies and the Doha Offers are restrictive, the gap between Doha Offers and policies is small.
There is a reasonable prospect that offers will be improved. The latest report on the status of the services negotiations (WTO, 2008) noted that further discussion was needed on issues relating to participants' level of ambition, their willingness to bind existing and improved levels of market access and national treatment, as well as specific reference to Modes 1 and 4 with respect to the treatment of sectors and modes of supply of export interest to developing countries. The chair of the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) also held a "signaling exercise" among a group of ministers, at the time that "modalities" in agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA) were being discussed. At the signaling exercise, participating ministers indicated that they might significantly improve their services offers. 
III. CONCLUSION
Our analysis suggests that negotiators have been content to let services lag. The best market access offers do not even reflect the liberalization that has already taken place. The "requestoffer" negotiating process, bilateral and plurilateral, seems to have resulted in a low-level equilibrium trap.
More effort to liberalize trade and investment in services at the multilateral level is needed. Perhaps greater progress could be made by turning the negotiating progress on its head, and instead of the incremental and unproductive request and offer process, Members could strive directly to define a final package. To be both worthwhile and attainable, such a "package" on services would have to be balanced from a mercantilist perspective, commercially relevant from a business perspective, and offer substance rather than rhetoric from a development perspective (Mattoo, 2005) . Indeed, the WTO's Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration sketched out similar ambitious aims. An agreement could follow the precedent of the WTO's Information Technology Agreement, where participation is limited to a "critical mass" of signatories who would extend the benefits also to non-participants.
Such a package could have three elements. First, a promise not to impose new restrictions on trade in services. This would dispel the specter of protectionism that hangs over outsourcing of business services -which is producing huge cost savings in the North and ever-widening export opportunities for the South.
Second, a commitment to eliminate barriers to foreign direct investment, either immediately or, in sectors where regulatory inadequacies need to be remedied, in a phased manner. The greatest benefits of securing openness to FDI, especially in infrastructure services, would accrue to the South while offering increased business opportunities to the North.
Third, agreement to allow somewhat greater freedom of international movement for individual service providers (mode 4 in WTO parlance) in order to fulfill specific services contracts.
Research shows large potential benefits to both the North and the South from the liberalization of mode 4, as it offers a way to realize the gains from trade while averting social and political costs in host countries and brain drain losses for source countries. Progress on mode 4 is critical to overall balance.
For there to be a reasonable prospect of achieving these goals, more attention needs to be given to the regulatory context in which services liberalization takes place.
First, negotiators could focus primarily on securing "national treatment", i.e. ending all discrimination on the entry and operation of foreign services providers, rather than on creating more intrusive disciplines. This will reassure regulators that multilateral commitments deprive them only of the freedom to discriminate, and not limit their freedom to regulate in any other way or adopt policies that improve sector performance.
Second, the development and trade community need to work together to establish a credible mechanism to provide regulatory assistance to support liberalization commitments by developing countries. This will reassure developing country policymakers that regulatory inadequacies that could undermine the benefits of liberalization will be remedied before any market-opening commitments take effect.
Third, it should be possible to make temporary entry of foreign services providers conditional on the fulfillment of specific conditions by source countries. Immigration authorities in host economies need to be assured that source countries will cooperate to screen services providers, to accept and facilitate their return, and to combat illegal migration.
The gains from properly managed liberalization of services trade are substantial. World Bank analysis has shown this to be the case even in very poor countries. An ambitious package in services may provide new dynamism to multilateral trade cooperation. Doing so may also allow the Doha Development Agenda to live up to its name. 
